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Abstract
We consider a game-theoretic model of information retrieval
with strategic authors. We examine two different utility
schemes: authors who aim at maximizing exposure and au-
thors who want to maximize active selection of their content
(i.e., the number of clicks). We introduce the study of author
learning dynamics in such contexts. We prove that under the
probability ranking principle (PRP), which forms the basis
of the current state-of-the-art ranking methods, any better-
response learning dynamics converges to a pure Nash equi-
librium. We also show that other ranking methods induce a
strategic environment under which such a convergence may
not occur.
1 Introduction
Information retrieval is probably the most central task car-
ried out by consumers and users of on-line media. The ba-
sic information retrieval task involves ranking documents
in a corpus by their relevance to the information needs ex-
pressed in a query. In adversarial retrieval settings such
as the Web, information resources (contents) are owned
by strategic bodies - website owners (henceforth authors).
Authors can strategically change their content in order
to improve their rankings in response to a query in a
practice referred to as search engine optimization (SEO)
(Gyo¨ngyi and Garcia-Molina 2005). Therefore, the authors
are players in a game, altering their content to increase their
utility: increase exposure of their content (in a plain content
setting) or to increase selection of their content (“clicks” in a
sponsored content setting). In this strategic game, the search
engine serves as a mediator between users and authors, and
attempts to match queries and websites.
Despite the tremendous amount of work on informa-
tion retrieval and SEO published during past decades,
mathematical modeling of the aforementioned strategic
behavior has only been formally suggested and studied
recently (Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland 2015;
Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland 2017;
Raifer et al. 2017). One central question in this regard
is whether learning dynamics, whereby at every step one
author alters her content to increase her utility, is likely
to converge. Convergence would suggest that authors
should only invest a considerably limited amount of time
altering their websites until their utility cannot be further
improved. An accompanying question is whether such
convergence occurs when state-of-the-art approaches to
information retrieval, aiming at ranking documents in the
corpus according to estimated relevance probabilities with
respect to a given query, are used. The basis for all such
retrieval methods is the probability ranking principle (PRP)
(Robertson 1977).
In this paper we introduce what is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first attempt to explore the learning dynam-
ics of strategic behavior in information retrieval systems
such as the Web, through a formal theoretical model. Our
main result proves that under the PRP, any better-response
learning dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
This result is obtained for the two prevalent utility schemes:
authors seeking content exposure (i.e., exposure-targeted),
and authors seeking to increase “clicks” in content selec-
tion (i.e., action-targeted). Interestingly, this learning dy-
namics convergence property, which rarely exists in games,
is obtained even though our class of games are not poten-
tial games (Monderer and Shapley 1996). We also show that
other plausible ranking methods may not induce such con-
vergence, which further highlights the significance of our
results.
1.1 Related Work
The concept of mediators in strategic environments
is widely known to the game-theory community
(Ashlagi, Monderer, and Tennenholtz 2009; Aumann 1974;
Monderer and Tennenholtz 2009), and the design of a
mediator (or in a different terminology, a mechanism) is
often called mechanism design (Nisan and Ronen 1999).
In the context of information retrieval, a search engine can
be viewed as a mediator between two parties: users and
authors.
Considering strategic behavior in an information retrieval
context is the aim of Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland
(2017). The work of Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland
presents a game-theoretic approach to informa-
tion retrieval, and illustrates that the myopic static
view falls short in dynamic and adversarial settings.
Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland explicitly assume that
users will select the highest ranked result, a somewhat strong
assumption but nevertheless justified by a large body of
empirical work (Butman et al. 2013; Joachims et al. 2005;
Liu and Wei 2016; Ghose, Goldfarb, and Han 2012).
Note that in this case, PRP coincides with
ranking the most relevant document highest.
Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland analyze the user
social welfare, defined as the quality of documents available
in the presence of strategic behavior of the authors. Interest-
ingly, they demonstrate that introducing randomization into
a ranking function can sometimes lead to social welfare that
transcends that of applying the PRP. In this paper we also
adopt the game-theoretic approach to information retrieval,
but explore a different criterion, which is the learning
dynamics in games induced by the selection of the PRP
as the mediator. Furthermore, beyond the action-targeted
utility suggested in Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland,
we also analyze exposure-targeted utility.
Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz (2018b) consider mediator
design in recommendation systems with strategic content
providers. They highlight several fairness-related properties
that a mediator should arguably satisfy, along with the re-
quirement of pure Nash equilibrium existence. They claim
against PRP, as they show that in their mathematical model
the PRP mediator (termed TOP in their work) satisfies the
fairness-related properties, but may lead to a game without
pure Nash equilibria and hence without better-response con-
vergence. However, their mathematical model differs from
the one in this paper, since e.g. they allow the mediator to
present an empty list of documents, which is highly unlikely
in information retrieval settings.
Designing a mediator for improved social welfare was re-
cently proposed by Ben-Porat et al. (2019), who also make
the connection between recommendation systems and facil-
ity location games (Hotelling 1929). In their model as well,
matching users with their nearest facility may yield a low so-
cial welfare in case the content providers are strategic. Their
goal is to design a mediator that optimizes welfare in equi-
librium and does not intervene too much.
In this work, however, we do not study the social
welfare, but rather focus on the learning dynamics.
Learning dynamics is an important concept in machine
learning and game theory (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006;
Claus and Boutilier 1998; Freund and Schapire 1999;
Palaiopanos, Panageas, and Piliouras 2017;
Syrgkanis et al. 2015; Meir et al. 2010;
Lev and Rosenschein 2012), and work on learning dy-
namics in games is considered instrumental, e.g., to un-
derstanding ad auctions (Cary et al. 2014). Better-response
learning dynamics are appealing to the (algorithmic) game
theory community, as they only assume a minimal form
of rationality: under any given profile, a player will act
to increase her individual utility. However, general tech-
niques for showing better-response learning convergence
in games are rare, and are based typically on coming up
with a potential function (Monderer and Shapley 1996),
see e.g. (Garg and Jaakkola 2016;
Palaiopanos, Panageas, and Piliouras 2017;
Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz 2018a). However, as exact
potential functions imply the games are congestion games
(Rosenthal 1973), it is easy to observe that our games do
not fit that category.
Another interesting class of games which are not potential
games for which better-response dynamics always converge
is (Milchtaich 1996). However, that setting is quite remote
from ours, as in Milchtaich’s work the players share a com-
mon set of strategies.
1.2 Our Contribution
Our main conceptual contribution is the explicit analysis of
learning dynamics in information retrieval systems that is
motivated by strategic behavior. Our demonstration of con-
vergence serves as an important justification for the use of
the PRP, and should be taken into account when designing
stable and robust information retrieval systems.
The key technical contribution of this paper is the proof
that under PRP any better-response dynamics converges
to a pure Nash equilibrium. We prove this claim for both
exposure-targeted and action-targeted utility schemes. As
stated above, the convergence of better-response learning
dynamics in our setting is obtained although the class of
games we consider do not have an exact potential function.
Moreover, we show that other ranking methods induce a
strategic environment under which such convergence may
not occur. Together, our results provide strong novel game-
theoretic justification to the PRP and illustrate its applicabil-
ity in an adversarial context such as the Web.
1.3 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 for-
malizes the model we adopt, as well as an informal intro-
duction to the relevant core game-theoretic concepts and an
illustrative example. In Section 3 we analyze better-response
learning with the PRP mediator for both utility schemes. In
Section 4 we show non-learnability of mediators other than
the PRP, and Section 5 is devoted to discussion and future
work. Due to space limitations, some of the proofs of this
paper are deferred to the supplementary material.
2 Problem Statement
An authors game is composed of a set of authorsN = [n]
def
=
{1, 2, . . . , n}, each owning one document/website/blog.
M = [m] is the set of topics, and we assume both n andm
are finite. An author’s pure strategy space is the set of all top-
ics, i.e., she can choose to write her document on any topic.
We further assume that each document is concerned with a
single topic. The set of all pure strategy profiles is denoted
by A = Mn, and each strategy profile a = (a1, . . . an)
corresponds to a set of documents. A query distribution D
overM is publicly known, where each query symbolizes the
user mass associated with that topic. Given a topic k, we de-
note by D(k) the demand for topic k. We further assume
w.l.o.g. that D(1) ≥ D(2) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m). That is, the top-
ics are sorted according to the query distribution mass in a
non-increasing order.
The matrix Q ∈ [0, 1]n×m is the quality matrix, where
Qj,k represents the quality for author j’s document if she
decides to write on topic k. This modeling allows an author
to have remarkable aptitude for one topic and poor aptitude
for another. For example, an economic guru is able to write
about sports, but his writing quality w.r.t. sports is substan-
tially lower than economics.
The function R is the mediator, which plays the role of a
ranking function or a search engine. The mediator ranks the
documents selected by the authors w.r.t. a given query (or
equivalently, a topic). We assume for simplicity that users
always read the document ranked first. This assumption is
consistent with many applications, e.g. the use of personal
assistants in mobile devices, where only the first ranked item
is shown to the user. Thus, we let R(Q, k,a) denote a dis-
tribution over the set of documents selected under a w.r.t.
a topic k ∈ M , which represents the probability of being
displayed in the first position. For ease of notation, we shall
also denote Rj(Q, k,a) as the probability that author j is
ranked first under the distribution R(Q, k,a).
The last component u is the utility function, which maps
every strategy profile to a real-valued vector of length n. In
this paper, we consider two different utility functions which
are motivated by current applications.
Under the exposure-targeted utility, denoted by uEx , an
author’s utility is the number of impressions her document
receives. Formally,
Definition 1 (Exposure-targeted utility). The exposure-
targeted utility of author j under a strategy profile a is given
by
uExj (a)
def
=
m∑
k=1
1aj=k ·D(k) ·Rj(Q, k,a).
Note that uEx depends solely on the user mass of the topic
she writes on and the probability of the mediator display-
ing her document. The other utility function is the action-
targeted utility, denoted by uAc.
Definition 2 (Action-targeted utility). The action-targeted
utility of author j under a strategy profile a is given by
uAcj (a)
def
=
m∑
k=1
1aj=k ·D(k) ·Rj(Q, k,a) ·Qj,k.
Namely, an author’s utility is the user mass of her selected
topic times the probability she is ranked first times the qual-
ity of her document.
Overall, an authors game can be represented as a tuple
G = 〈N,M,D,Q,R, u〉.
It is convenient to quantify the following; given a strategy
profilea, letBk(a) denote the highest quality of a document
on topic k , i.e.,
Bk(a)
def
= max
1≤j≤n
{Qj,k · 1aj=k}.
Moreover, we denote by Hk(a) the number of authors
whose documents have the highest quality among those who
write on topic k under a,
Hk(a)
def
= |{j | j ∈ [n], Qj,k · 1aj=k = Bk(a)}|.
Unless stated otherwise, we analyze games with a particu-
lar mediator, which is based on the PRP. Since we restrict the
ranking list to include one rank only, the PRP coincides with
ranking first the highest quality document on that topic. We
denote by RPRP the mediator that displays the document
with the highest quality. In case there are several documents
with the highest quality, RPRP ranks first each one of them
with equal probability. Formally,
Definition 3 (The PRP Mediator). Given a quality matrix
Q, a topic k and a strategy profile a, the RPRP ranks first
the document of each author j with a probability of
RPRPj (Q, k,a)
def
=
{
1
Hk(a)
Qj,k · 1aj=k = Bk(a)
0 otherwise
.
2.1 Further Game Theory Notation
We now informally introduce some basic game theory con-
cepts used throughout this paper. For an action profile
a = (a1, . . . , aj , , . . . , an) ∈ A, we denote by a−j =
(a1, . . . , aj−1, aj+1, . . . , an) ∈ A−j the action profile of
all authors except author j. A strategy a′j ∈ Aj is called
a better response of author j w.r.t. a strategy profile a if
uj(a
′
j ,a−j) > uj(a). Similarly, a
′
j ∈ Aj is said to be a best
response if uj(a
′
j ,a−j) ≥ maxaj∈Aj uj(aj ,a−j) . We say
that a strategy profile a is a pure Nash equilibrium (herein
denoted PNE) if every author plays a best response under a.
Given a strategy profile a ∈ A, an improvement step is
a profile (a′j ,a−j) such that a
′
j is a better response of au-
thor j w.r.t. a. An improvement path γ = (a1,a2, . . . )
is a sequence of improvement steps, where the improve-
ments can be performed by different authors. Namely, in
any improvement step along the improvement path exactly
one author deviates from the strategy she selected in the
previous step, but different authors can deviate in differ-
ent steps. When the path γ is clear from the context, we
denote by pr the author that improves in step r. Since
the number of strategy profiles is finite, every infinite im-
provement path must contain an improvement cycle. A non-
cooperative game G has the finite improvement property (FIP
for brevity) if all the improvement paths are finite; in such
a game every better-response dynamics converges to a PNE
(Monderer and Shapley 1996).
2.2 An Illustrative Example
To further clarify our notation and setting, we provide the
following example. Consider a game with n = 2 authors,
m = 3 topics, a query distribution massD such thatD(1) =
0.5, D(2) = 0.3, D(3) = 0.2, a quality matrix
Q =
(
0.1 0.4 0.8
0.9 0.4 0.2
)
,
andRPRP as the mediator. Given the utility function, the in-
duced game can be viewed as a normal form bi-matrix game,
as presented in Figure 1.
First, consider the exposure-targetedutility function. Con-
sider the strategy profile (a1, a2) = (2, 2). Under this strat-
egy profile the two authors write on topic 2, and their qual-
ity on that topic is the same, i.e., Q1,2 = Q2,2 = 0.4; thus,
R1(Q, 2, (2, 2)) = R2(Q, 2, (2, 2)) = 0.5 and
uEx1 (2, 2) = u
Ex
2 (2, 2) =
D(2)
2
= 0.15.
[ topic 1 topic 2 topic 3
topic 1 0, 0.5 0.5, 0.3 0.5, 0.2
topic 2 0.3, 0.5 0.15, 0.15 0.3, 0.2
topic 3 0.2, 0.5 0.2, 0.3 0.2, 0
]
,
(a) exposure-targeted
[ topic 1 topic 2 topic 3
topic 1 0, 0.45 0.05, 0.12 0.05, 0.04
topic 2 0.12, 0.45 0.06, 0.06 0.12, 0.04
topic 3 0.16, 0.45 0.16, 0.12 0.16, 0
]
(b) action-targeted
Figure 1: The normal form games induced by the example in Subsection 2.2. Subfigure (a) represents the utilities of author
1 (row) and author 2 (column) under the exposure-targeted utility function, while Subfigure (b) represents the utilities under
action-targeted utility function.
Notice that author 2 can improve her utility by deviating
to topic 1, i.e., to the strategy profile (2, 1). Indeed, this is
an improvement step w.r.t. (2, 2). In this case, her utility is
uEx2 (2, 1) = 0.5. Clearly (2, 1) is a PNE of this game.
The action-targeted utility function induces a different bi-
matrix game. The reader can verify that under this utility
scheme, the unique PNE is (3, 1).
3 Better-Response Learning with the PRP
Mediator
In this section we show that under the PRP mediator, every
better-response dynamics converges to a PNE, for both util-
ity schemes. To make this claim more concrete, we use the
following definition.
Definition 4. We say that a mediator R is u-learnable if
every game induced by R and the utility function u has the
FIP property.
Clearly, if any game that consists of (R, u) has the FIP
property, then the authors can learn a PNE using any better-
response dynamics. We use the above definition to crystal-
lize our goals for this section: we wish to show that RPRP
is both uEx-learnable and uAc-learnable. Namely, in Sub-
section 3.1 we show that under the PRP mediator and the
exposure-targeted utility function, every improvement path
is finite. In Subsection 3.2 we prove the equivalent statement
for the action-targeted utility function.
Before we go on, we claim that the class of games induced
by the PRP mediator does not have an exact potential.
Proposition 1. The class of games induced by RPRP and
either one of uEx or uAc does not have an exact potential.
Proof sketch of Proposition 1. We show that the neces-
sary condition for the existence of an exact potential
(Monderer and Shapley 1996) does not hold for a general
authors game with n ≥ 3 authors. This result is obtained
for both utility schemes.
As mentioned in Section 1 above, showing the conver-
gence of any better-response dynamics in the lack of exact
potential is challenging, and is nevertheless our goal for the
rest of this section. In light of that, we shall introduce a fur-
ther notation.
Definition 5. Given a finite improvement path γ =
(a1, . . .al), we define
Wk(γ)
def
= min
1≤r≤l
{Hk(a
r)},
i.e.,Wk(γ) is the minimal number of authors writing docu-
ments with the highest quality on topic k.
Note that the minimum is taken over all steps in γ.
3.1 Exposure-Targeted Utility
We now focus on games with RPRP and uEx, namely the
PRP mediator and the exposure-targeted utility function.We
show that every improvement path is finite, suggesting that
any better-response dynamics converges. The proof of this
convergence relies on several supporting claims.
The following Proposition 2 claims that in every improve-
ment step, the improving author writes with a quality of at
least the highest quality obtained in the preceding improve-
ment step, on that particular topic.
Proposition 2. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let
ar+1pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. It holds that
Qpr,k ≥ Bk(a
r).
We now bound the utility the improving author obtains in
the corresponding improvement step, when her document’s
quality does not exceed the highest quality (on that particular
topic) in the preceding improvement step.
Proposition 3. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let
ar+1pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. If Qpr,k ≤
Bk(a
r), then
uExpr (a
r+1) ≤
D(k)
Wk(γ) + 1
.
Next, we characterize a property that must hold in im-
provement cycles, under the false assumption that such ex-
ist. We prove that if an improvement cycle exists, the quality
of the first-ranked document is constant throughout the im-
provement cycle; this must hold for every topic.
Lemma 1. If c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement
cycle, then for every improvement step r and every topic k it
holds that Bk(a
r) = Bk(a
r+1).
Proof sketch. We give here a high-level overview of the
proof and refer the reader to the appendix for the formal
proof.
Under the false assumption that an improvement cycle
exists, assume that the claim does not hold. Namely, as-
sume that c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement cy-
cle (w.l.o.g. c is a simple improvement cycle), and that
there exist an improvement step r and a topic k such that
Bk(a
r) 6= Bk(a
r+1).
Recall that D(1) ≥ · · · ≥ D(m), i.e., the topics are
sorted according to the query distribution mass in a non-
increasing order. We prove by induction on the topic index k
that Bk(a
r) ≤ Bk(a
r+1) holds for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1.
Clearly, if this holds for every improvement step r then
Bk(a
1) ≤ · · · ≤ Bk(a
l) = Bk(a
1);
thus, all inequalities hold in equality and Bk(a
r) 6=
Bk(a
r+1) cannot occur.
Base, k = 1: Assume the assertion does not hold for k = 1;
hence, there exists r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, such that B1(a
r) >
B1(a
r+1). This means that there exists an author who writes
with the highest quality on topic 1 in the step r, and then
she deviates to another topic in step r + 1. Moreover, due
to the strict inequality, that author is the unique author to
write with the highest quality on topic 1 in step r; hence, her
utility in step r is exactlyD(1). When she deviates, she can
obtain at most D(2), but recall that D(1) ≥ D(2); hence,
this deviation is not beneficial.
Step: Assume the assertion holds for k ∈ {1, 2, . . .K − 1},
i.e., Bk(a
r) = Bk(a
r+1) for every step r. We show that
BK(a
r) > BK(a
r+1) for a step r implies that the improv-
ing author in improvement step r deviates to a topic with a
lower index. Using the bound obtained in Proposition 3 and
the induction hypothesis, we show that there must be an im-
proving author which does not increase her utility after pre-
forming the deviation, which is clearly a contradiction.
Lemma 1 implies that the only element that varies
throughout an improvement cycle, if such exists, is the num-
ber of authors who write on each topic. In particular, the
highest quality on each topic remains constant. It also sug-
gests that any improving author is not the only author writ-
ing the highest quality document on the topic to which she
deviated.
Consider an arbitrary improvement step, and denote by k
the topic that the improving author writes on in the improve-
ment step. The improving author joins a (non-empty) set of
authors which are already writing documents with the high-
est quality on topic k. Since we deal with a cycle, at some
point an author abandons topic k, and deviates to another
topic, say k′. In Lemma 2 we bound the utility of the im-
proving author (deviating to topic k) with that of the author
who deviated to k′.
Lemma 2. If c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement
cycle, then for every improvement step r and topic k such
that ar+1pr = k there exist (r
′, k′) such that ar
′+1
pr′
= k′ and
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
<
D(k′)
Wk′ (c) + 1
.
Proof sketch. Let r, k be such that ar+1pr = k. By defini-
tion of improvement step arpr 6= k. From Lemma 1 we
know that Bk(a
r) = Bk(a
r+1); thus, Qpr,k = Bk(a
r) and
Hk(a
r) 6= Hk(a
r+1). Afterwards, we prove another claim
which guarantees that there exists r′ such that
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
= uExpr′ (a
r′)
holds. In addition, pr′ is the improving author, and so
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
= uExpr′ (a
r′) < uExpr′ (a
r′+1). (1)
Clearly, ar
′+1
pr′
= k′ 6= k. Lemma 1 indicates that
Bk′(a
r′) = Bk′(a
r′+1); hence, Qpr′ ,k′ ≤ Bk′(a
r′). Hav-
ing showed that the condition of Proposition 3 holds, we in-
voke it for r′, k′ and conclude that
uExpr′ (a
r′+1) ≤
D(k′)
Wk′(c) + 1
.
Combining this fact with Equation (1), we get
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
<
D(k′)
Wk′ (c) + 1
.
In Theorem 1 below we leverage Lemma 2 to show that
improvement cycles cannot exist.
Theorem 1. RPRP is uEx-learnable.
Proof of Theorem 1. To show thatRPRP is uEx-learnable it
suffices to show that every improvement path is finite. More-
over, every improvement path cannot contain more than a
finite number of different strategy profiles, as m and n are
finite; therefore, if γ is infinite it must contain an improve-
ment cycle. We are left to prove that γ cannot contain an
improvement cycle.
Assume by contradiction that γ contains an improve-
ment cycle c = (a1,a2, . . . ,al = a1). Let r1 be an ar-
bitrary improvement step and denote by k1 the topic such
that ar1+1pr1
= k1. From Lemma 2 we know that there exist
(r2, k2) such that a
r2+1
pr2
= k2 and
D(k1)
Wk1(c) + 1
<
D(k2)
Wk2(c) + 1
.
Since ar2+1pr2
= k2, we can now use Lemma 2 again in order
to find (r3, k3) such that a
r3+1
pr3
= k3 and
D(k2)
Wk2(c) + 1
<
D(k3)
Wk3(c) + 1
.
This process can be extended to achieve additional
k4, k5, . . . , km+1 such that
D(k1)
Wk1(c) + 1
<
D(k2)
Wk2 (c) + 1
< . . . <
D(km+1)
Wkm+1(c) + 1
.
Since there are only m topics and that the inequality above
contains m + 1 elements, there are at least two elements
which are identical; thus we obtain a contradiction. We de-
duce that an improvement cycle cannot exist.
Theorem 1 concludes the analysis of the exposure-
targeted utility function.
3.2 Action-Targeted Utility
After analyzing games with exposure-targeted utility, we
proceed to action-targeted utility. The main result of this
subsection is that RPRP is uAc-learnable, which is analo-
gous to the main result of the previous one. Interestingly,
achieving this result requires a more subtle treatment. To
motivate it, consider the following: under uEx, in a case
where the quality of an author’s document on topic k ex-
ceeds the quality of all other authors writing on topic k, she
will not deviate to a topic with a higher index (a topic with
a lower or equal user mass). This, however, is not true for
uAc. For instance, consider the strategy profile (2, 1) in the
example given in Subsection 2.2. Under uEx, author 1 can-
not increase her utility by deviating to topic 3 (a topic with
a lower user mass). In contrast, under uAc, author 1 can im-
prove her utility by deviating to topic 3. To assist in that, let
Sk(γ) denote the highest quality of a document written on
topic k throughout a finite improvement path γ. Formally,
Definition 6. Given a topic k and an improvement path γ =
(a1, . . . ,al),
Sk(γ)
def
= max
1≤r≤l
{Bk(a
r)}.
In Proposition 4 we bound the utility of an improving au-
thor in an improvement step.
Proposition 4. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let
ar+1pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. If Qpr,k ≤
Bk(a
r), then
uAcpr (a
r+1) ≤
D(k) · Sk(γ)
Wk(γ) + 1
.
Notice that Sk(γ) ≤ 1 for every k and every γ; thus, the
bound given in Proposition 3 trivially holds for uAc. How-
ever, proving this tighter bound becomes essential for re-
futing the existence of improvement cycles under uAc. By
proving additional supporting lemmas (which are further
elaborated in the appendix), we show that
Theorem 2. RPRP is uAc-learnable.
4 Non-Learnability under Other Mediators
In the previous section we showed a powerful result: RPRP
is both uEx-learnable and uAc-learnable. In other words,
when using RPRP , any better-response dynamics con-
verges; this is true for both utility schemes. In fact,RPRP is
not the only mediator under which such convergence occurs.
For instance, LetRRAND be the randommediator, such that
for any author j and any topic k,
RRANDj (Q, k,a)
def
=
{
1∑
n
i=1
1ai=k
aj = k
0 otherwise
.
By showing that under uEx any game with RRAND can be
reduced to a game with RPRP , we conclude that
Proposition 5. RRAND is uEx-learnable.
Proof sketch. We prove the claim by showing that under
uEx any game with RRAND can be reduced to a game with
RPRP , such that the two games are strategically equivalent.
This is done by taking any gameG with RRAND as the me-
diator and a quality matrix Q, and reduce it to a game G′
with RPRP as the mediator and Q′ as the quality matrix,
such that Q′j,k = 1 for every j ∈ N and k ∈M .
Since both G,G′ consists of the exposure-targeted utility
function, we omit the super-script Ex and use the super-
script G to specify the utility of author j under the strategy
profile a in G, i.e., uGj (a), and equivalently u
G′
j (a) for G
′.
By definition of exposure-targeted utility andRPRP , for ev-
ery valid j and a it holds that
uG
′
j (a) =
m∑
k=1
1aj=k ·D(k) ·R
PRP
j (Q
′, k,a)
= D(aj) · R
PRP
j (Q
′, aj,a)
= D(aj) ·
1
Haj (a)
= D(aj) · R
RAND
j (Q, aj ,a)
=
m∑
k=1
1aj=k ·D(k) ·R
RAND
j (Q, k,a) = u
G
j (a).
SinceG′ possesses RPRP as the mediator, Theorem 1 guar-
antees that G′ has the FIP property. Since we showedG and
G′ are strategically equivalent, G also has the FIP property,
and in particular does not contain improvement cycles.
Notice that RRAND treats every document the same, re-
gardless of its quality. However, in many (and perhaps even
most) scenarios mediators seek to promote high-quality con-
tent. Therefore, the reader may wonder whether other plau-
sible mediators are uEx-learnable or uAc-learnable. We now
focus on a wide and intuitive family of mediators, which we
term scoring mediators.
Definition 7. LetR be a mediator.We say thatR is a scoring
mediator if there exists a non-decreasing function f : R →
R+ such that for every Q, k,a and author index j it holds
that
Rj(Q, k,a)
def
=
{
f(Qj,k)∑
n
i=1
1ai=k
·f(Qi,k)
aj = k
0 otherwise
.
It this case, we denote R = Rf for the corresponding f .
Under a scoring mediator every author receives a prob-
ability according to the proportion of her score over the
sum of the scores of all author writing on that topic. No-
tice that if Rf is a scoring mediator such that the corre-
sponding f is constant, we get Rf = RRAND. In addition,
this family also includes celebrated mediators, e.g. the soft-
max function (for f(Qj,k) = e
Qj,k ), which is very popular
in machine learning applications, or the linear function (for
f(Qj,k) = Qj,k) that is common in probabilistic models for
decision making (for instance, in the Bradley-Terry model
(Bradley and Terry 1952)). Noticeably, the RPRP is not a
scoring mediator. In the rest of this section, we show non-
convergence of better-response dynamics for general fami-
lies of scoring mediators.
4.1 Exposure-Targeted Utility
In this subsection we prove that, under mild assumptions,
scoring mediators are not uEx-learnable (as opposed to
RRAND). We restrict ourselves to mediators for which the
corresponding function f is continuous, and exhibits the fol-
lowing property: the ratio between the score of the highest
quality and the lowest quality is greater than two (note that
this property holds trivially if the score of the lowest quality
is zero, i.e., f(0) = 0). Among others, this class of medi-
ators contains mediators based on softmax and linear func-
tions, as described above.
Theorem 3. Let Rf be a scoring mediator. If f is a con-
tinuous function such that f(1) > 2f(0), then Rf is not
uEx-learnable.
Proof sketch. It is sufficient to show that for every f that
satisfies the theorem’s conditions, we can construct a game
instance with an improvement cycle. We exploit the prop-
erties of f to construct a game with four authors and three
topics, and show that an improvement cycle exists. Let Rf
be a scoring mediator with the corresponding function f ,
which we assume exhibits f(1) > 2f(0). Due to the In-
termediate Value Theorem, there exist x1, x2, x3 such that
0 < x3 < x2 < x1 ≤ 1 and
f(x2)
f(x3)
>
2f(x1)
f(x2)
> 2.
For brevity, denote c1 =
f(x1)
f(x2)
and c2 =
f(x2)
f(x3)
, and ob-
serve that c2 > 2c1. Consider a game with |N | = 4 authors,
|M | = 3 topics and a quality matrix Q such that

x1 0 0
x1 x2 0
x2 0 x3
0 x3 x2

 .
The only missing ingredient is the distribution D over the
topics. The selection of such D is crucial: we shall select D
to allow improvement cycles. Denote
D(1) =
1
2− 3ǫ
,D(2) =
1− 2ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
, D(3) =
1− 4ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
,
for some 0 < ǫ ≤ 14 . It can be verified that D is a valid dis-
tribution over the set of topics. Consider the strategy profiles
a
1 = (1, 1, 1, 2), a2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a3 = (1, 2, 3, 2),
a
4 = (1, 2, 3, 3), a5 = (1, 1, 3, 3), a6 = (1, 1, 1, 3).
In the rest of the proof we show that ǫ can be selected such
that the cycle c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) is an
improvement cycle of the game we constructed. More pre-
cisely, we prove that for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 6, uExpr (a
r) <
uExpr (a
r+1). This suggests thatRf is not uEx-learnable.
While all it takes to prove Theorem 3 is to show a single
game instance with an improvement cycle, we can actually
construct infinitely many games which do not possess FIP.
Moreover, our construction can be viewed as a sub-game in
a much broader game, i.e., with more authors and topics.
4.2 Action-Targeted Utility
When analyzing scoring mediators, an additional difference
between the two utility schemes emerges. In the improve-
ment cycle constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, there ex-
ists an improvement step in which the improving author de-
creases the quality of her document but still increases her
utility. Under the action-targeted utility function, such a de-
crease may not be translated to improved utility. Namely, the
technique employed in Theorem 3 for constructing a game
that possesses an improvement cycle might not work here.
Nevertheless, the following theorem shows non-learnability
under uAc of scoring mediators that boost high-quality con-
tent. For example, a mediatorRf where the corresponding f
satisfies f(1) > 6f(12 ) assigns a substantially higher score
to the highest quality than a mediocre one.
Theorem 4. Let Rf be a scoring mediator. If f is a con-
tinuous function such that f(1) > 2(2α− 1)f
(
1
α
)
for some
α > 1, then Rf is not uAc-learnable.
Notice the resemblance between the condition of Theo-
rem 3 to that of Theorem 4. Due to space limitations, ad-
ditional results on the non-learnability of other scoring me-
diators under uAc are omitted and further elaborated in the
appendix.
5 Discussion
We introduced the study of learning dynamics in
the context of information retrieval games. Our re-
sults address learning in the framework introduced by
Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland (2017), where authors
are action-targeted as well as for a complementary type
of information retrieval game in which the authors’ aim
is to maximize their exposure. In particular, our re-
sults show that a mediator that operates according to the
PRP (Robertson 1977) induces a game in which learning-
dynamics converges; the latter is true for both exposure-
targeted and action-targeted utility schemes. Moreover, we
have also demonstrated that this convergence is a virtue of
the PRP, and does not apply for other relevant mediators.
One prominent question is the time required for the au-
thors to converge, namely, finding the worst-case length of
an improvement path. It turns out that there is a class of
games where the length of the best-response paths is easy
to analyze.
Consider the exposure target utility, and assume that D is
strictly decreasing, the number of authors equals the number
of topics, and that the matrix Q is generic, i.e., has n × m
distinct values. The induced game exhibits a unique equi-
librium: topic 1 is assigned to the author with the highest
quality w.r.t. topic 1. Topic 2 is assigned to the author with
the highest quality on that topic, from the set of authors who
were not assigned before. Clearly, the PNE is computed by
following this process until every author/topic is assigned.
Consequently, any best-response dynamics where the au-
thors play in a round-robin fashion will converge after at
most a quadratic number of improvement steps in the num-
ber of authors. A similar observation applies to action tar-
geted utility under a slightly different notion of generality of
Q. The general question of convergence rate is nevertheless
left open.
Our model, as any other novel model that pretends to ex-
plain theoretical aspects of real-world systems, has its lim-
itations. To name a few, we assume the set of authors and
topics are fixed, while in reality they are often dynamic; we
assume that the quality of documents is perfectly observed
by the mediator, which only approximates modern search
engines. Although not ultimate, we do believe that our mod-
eling, which extends a model that is already acknowledged
as valuable (Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland 2017),
serves as an important justification for the use of the PRP,
and may be an important step for future work to circumvent
the limitations presented above. We note that our learning
dynamics is based on applying an author’s response to the
current behavior of other authors. In fact, this assumes that
the only information available to the author is the quality
of the documents currently published, and assumes nothing
about information available to an author on other authors’
(unobserved) qualities. Relaxing the assumption that pub-
lished documents’ qualities can be observed goes beyond the
scope of our work, and may be a subject for future research.
An interesting future direction is to expand
the information retrieval setting to a setup where
each author’s document may include several top-
ics. This issue is treated in a preliminary manner in
(Ben-Basat, Tennenholtz, and Kurland 2017) and it may be
of interest to see whether our results can be extended to
that context as well. It may be also interesting to study the
quality of the equilibrium (as far as users’ social welfare is
concerned) reached under PRP. Would the best equilibrium
be obtained under better-response learning dynamics?
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A Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof makes use of the following theorems by Monderer and Shapley, which are stated slightly
different for ease of presentation.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 2.8,(Monderer and Shapley 1996)). Let G be a two-by-two bimatrix game such that(
a1,1, b1,1 a1,2, b1,2
a2,1, b2,1 a2,2, b2,2
)
.
Then G is an exact potential game if and only if
a2,1 − a1,1 + b2,2 − b2,1 + a1,2 − a2,2 + b1,1 − b1,2 = 0 (2)
Further,
Theorem 6 (Corollary 2.9,(Monderer and Shapley 1996)). A gameG is an exact potential game if and only if every two-by-two
subgame of G is an exact potential game.
To show that the class of games induced by the PRP mediator and uEx (equivalently, uAc) does not have an exact potential,
it is sufficient to show a subgame of a larger game which is not an exact potential game.
Consider a gameG with n = 3 authors,m = 2 topics,D(1) = D(2) = 0.5 and a quality matrix
Q =
(
0.3 0.4
0.5 0.7
0.1 0.4
)
.
We first focus on uEx. Observe that the bimatrix game describing the utilities of authors 1 (rows) and 2 (columns) induced by
setting a3 = 2 is [ topic 1 topic 2
topic 1 0, 0.5 0.5, 0.5
topic 2 0.25, 0.5 0, 0.5
]
.
The above bimatrix game does not satisfy the condition given in Equality (2), since
0.25− 0 + 0.5− 0.5 + 0.5− 0 + 0.5− 0.5 = 0.75 6= 0;
hence, Theorem 5 implies that G does not have an exact potential.
Next, consider a game G′ with the same N,M,Q,D, and let uAc be the utility function. Let a3 = 2, and observe that the
utility bimatrix of authors 1 and 2 is
[ topic 1 topic 2
topic 1 0, 0.25 0.15, 0.35
topic 2 0.1, 0.25 0, 0.35
]
.
Here again,
0.1− 0 + 0.35− 0.25 + 0.15− 0 + 0.25− 0.35 = 0.25 6= 0;
thus, Theorem 5 implies that G′ does not have an exact potential.
B Omitted Proofs from Subsection 3.1
Proof of Proposition 2. Since author pr improves her utility, u
Ex
pr
(ar) < uExpr (a
r+1). By definition of RPRP , if Qpr,k <
Bk(a
r) then uExpr (a
r+1) = 0 ≤ uExpr (a
r), which results in a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. Combined with Proposition 2, we know that
Qpr ,k = Bk(a
r). (3)
Notice that arpr 6= k and a
r+1
pr
= k; hence, together with Equation (3) we obtain
Hk(a
r+1) = Hk(a
r) + 1
Def. ofWk(γ)
≥ Wk(γ) + 1. (4)
Observe that Equation (4) suggests that
uExpr (a
r+1) =
D(k)
Hk(ar+1)
=
D(k)
Hk(ar) + 1
≤
D(k)
Wk(γ) + 1
,
which concludes the proof of this proposition.
Proposition 6. If c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement cycle and k is a topic such that the following properties hold
1. there exists an improvement step r1 satisfyingHk(a
r1) 6= Hk(a
r1+1), and
2. for every improvement step r2, Bk(a
r2) = Bk(a
r2+1),
then there exist an index r such that arpr = k and
uExpr (a
r) =
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
.
Proof of Proposition 6. From Property 1 we know that there exists an improvement step r1 such that Hk(a
r1) 6= Hk(a
r1+1).
Assume w.l.o.g. thatHk(a
r1) > Hk(a
r1+1); hence
Hk(a
r1) > Hk(a
r1+1) ≥Wk(c) + 1. (5)
By the definition ofWk(c) we know that there exists an improvement step r3 such that
Hk(a
r3) = Wk(c). (6)
From Property 2 we get that for every improvement step r2, Bk(a
r2) = Bk(a
r2+1), which implies that
|Hk(a
r2)−Hk(a
r2+1)| ≤ 1 (7)
Combining Equations (5),(6) and (7) with the fact that c is an improvement cycle leads to the fact that there must exist an
improvement step r such that ar ∈ {ar1 ,ar1+1, . . . ,ar3−1},Hk(a
r) =Wk(c)+1 andHk(a
r+1) =Wk(c). This implies that
arpr = k and Qpr,k = Bk(a
r); therefore,
uExpr (a
r) =
D(k)
Hk(ar)
=
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that c is a simple improvement cycle. First, we prove by induction on the topic index k
that Bk(a
r) ≤ Bk(a
r+1) holds for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1. Later, we leverage this result to prove the statement of the lemma.
Base: Assume the assertion does not hold for k = 1; hence, there exists r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l− 1, such that B1(a
r) > B1(a
r+1). As
a result, it holds for the improving author pr in step r that Qpr,1 > B1(a
r
−pr
) and H1(a
r) = 1. In words, the quality of pr’s
document exceeds all other qualities under ar on topic 1; thus,
D(1) = uExpr (a
r). (8)
In addition, ar+1 is an improvement step for author pr, and so u
Ex
pr
(ar) < uExpr (a
r+1). Combined with Equation (8),
D(1) < uExpr (a
r+1). (9)
On the other hand, uExpr (a
r+1) ≤ D(ar+1pr ) holds; thus, Equation (9) implies that D(1) < D(a
r+1
pr
), which is clearly a contra-
diction since D(1) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m).
Step: Suppose the assertion holds for every k where k < K ≤ m, but does not hold forK . Similarly to the base case, there
exists r1, 1 ≤ r1 ≤ l − 1, such that BK(a
r1) > BK(a
r1+1). As a result, Qpr1 ,K > BK(a
r1
−pr1
) and HK(a
r1) = 1 hold,
implying that
D(K) = uExpr1 (a
r1). (10)
In addition, uExpr1
(ar1) < uExpr1 (a
r1+1) holds since pr1 is the improving author; hence, with Equation (10) we get
D(K) < uExpr1 (a
r1+1). (11)
Let k1 denote the topic that author pr1 is writing on under a
r1+1, i.e., k1 = a
r1+1
pr1
. By definition of uEx we obtain
uExpr1
(ar1+1) ≤ D(k1). (12)
Recall that D(1) ≥ · · · ≥ D(m); hence, Equations (11) and (12) suggest that D(K) < D(k1) holds, and therefore we are
guaranteed that k1 < K .
Since k1 < K , the induction hypothesis hints that Bk1(a
r1) = Bk1(a
r1+1); therefore, Qpr1 ,k1 ≤ Bk1(a
r1) holds and by
Proposition 2 we get that Qpr1 ,k1 = Bk1(a
r1). Notice that c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition
3 holds; thus, by invoking it for r1, k1, we get
uExpr1
(ar1+1) ≤
D(k1)
Wk1 (c) + 1
.
Together with Equation (11), we conclude that
D(K) <
D(k1)
Wk1(c) + 1
. (13)
Next, we wish to find an improvement step such that the improving author’s utility strictly bounds the right-hand-side of
Equation (13). Since ar1+1pr1
= k1 and Qpr1 ,k1 = Bk1(a
r1) we get that Hk1(a
r1) 6= Hk1(a
r1+1). In addition, from the
induction hypothesis, we get that for every improvement step r′, Bk1(a
r′) = Bk1(a
r′+1); hence we can invoke Proposition 6
which guarantees the existence of an index r2 such that a
r2
pr2
= k1 and
D(k1)
Wk1(c) + 1
= uExpr2 (a
r2). (14)
Since pr2 is the improving author u
Ex
pr2
(ar2) < uExpr2 (a
r2+1) holds, which together with Equation (14) implies
D(k1)
Wk1(c) + 1
< uExpr2
(ar2+1). (15)
Let ar2+1pr2
= k2. By definition of u
Ex, we know that
uExpr2
(ar2+1) ≤ D(k2). (16)
Observe that k2 < K must hold. To see this, assume otherwise that k2 ≥ K , and D(k2) ≤ D(K) follows. Incorporating this
assumption with Equations (13),(15) and (16) we obtain
D(K) <
D(k1)
Wk1 (c) + 1
< uExpr2
(ar2+1) ≤ D(k2) ≤ D(K),
which is a contradiction; hence, k2 < K . The induction hypothesis hints that Bk2(a
r2) = Bk2(a
r2+1), implying Qpr2 ,k2 ≤
Bk2(a
r2).
Here again, the condition of Proposition 3 holds; thus, by invoking it for r2, k2 we conclude that
uExpr2
(ar2+1) ≤
D(k2)
Wk2 (c) + 1
.
Together with Equation (15), we conclude that
D(k1)
Wk1 (c) + 1
<
D(k2)
Wk2(c) + 1
.
We have therefore bound the right-hand-side of Equation (13) as desired.
This process can be extended to obtain additional k3, k4, . . . , kK , such that for all i ∈ [K], ki < K and
D(k1)
Wk1 (c) + 1
<
D(k2)
Wk2(c) + 1
<
D(k3)
Wk3(c) + 1
< . . . <
D(kK)
WkK (c) + 1
.
While the inequality above contains K elements, there are only K − 1 topics with index lower than K; hence, at least two of
them must be identical, and we obtain a contradiction. We deduce that BK(a
r) ≤ BK(a
r+1) for every step r.
This concludes the proof of the induction. Ultimately, to end the proof of this lemma, fix a topic k. Due to the induction
above,Bk(a
r) ≤ Bk(a
r+1) holds for every 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, i.e.,
Bk(a
1) ≤ Bk(a
2) ≤ . . . ≤ Bk(a
l−1) ≤ Bk(a
l) = Bk(a
1).
The left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the inequality above are identical; thus, they must all hold in equality. This
concludes the proof of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let r, k such that ar+1pr = k. From Lemma 1 we know that for every improvement step r
′′, Bk(a
r′′) =
Bk(a
r′′+1); thus, Qpr ,k ≤ Bk(a
r) which by Proposition 2 leads to
Qpr ,k = Bk(a
r). (17)
By definition of improvement step arpr 6= k; hence together with Equation (17) we get that Hk(a
r) 6= Hk(a
r+1). Notice that
c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition 6 holds; hence, by invoking it for r, k we conclude the
existence of an index r′ such that ar
′
pr′
= k and
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
= uExpr′ (a
r′).
In addition, pr′ is the improving author, and so
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
= uExpr′ (a
r′) < uExpr′ (a
r′+1). (18)
Clearly, ar
′+1
pr′
= k′ 6= k. Lemma 1 indicates that Bk′(a
r′) = Bk′(a
r′+1); hence, Qpr′ ,k′ ≤ Bk′(a
r′). Having showed the
condition of Proposition 3 holds, we invoke it for r′, k′ and conclude that
uExpr′ (a
r′+1) ≤
D(k′)
Wk′ (c) + 1
.
Combining this fact with Equation (18), we get
D(k)
Wk(c) + 1
<
D(k′)
Wk′(c) + 1
.
C Omitted Proofs from Subsection 3.2
Proposition 7. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let ar+1pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. It holds that
Qpr,k ≥ Bk(a
r).
Proof of Proposition 7. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, since author pr improves her utility, u
Ac
pr
(ar) < uAcpr (a
r+1).
By definition of RPRP , if Qpr,k < Bk(a
r) then uAcpr (a
r+1) = 0 ≤ uAcpr (a
r), which results in a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Combined with Proposition 7, we know that
Qpr ,k = Bk(a
r). (19)
Notice that arpr 6= k and a
r+1
pr
= k; hence, together with Equation (19) we obtain
Hk(a
r+1) = Hk(a
r) + 1
Def. ofWk(γ)
≥ Wk(γ) + 1. (20)
Observe that Equation (20) suggests that
uAcpr (a
r+1) =
D(k) ·Qpr ,k
Hk(ar+1)
=
D(k) ·Bk(a
r)
Hk(ar) + 1
≤
D(k) · Sk(γ)
Wk(γ) + 1
,
which concludes the proof of this proposition.
Proposition 8. If c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement cycle and k is a topic such that the following properties hold
1. there exists an improvement step r1 satisfyingHk(a
r1) 6= Hk(a
r1+1), and
2. for every improvement step r2, Bk(a
r2) = Sk(c),
then there exist an index r such that arpr = k and
uAcpr (a
r) =
D(k) · Sk(c)
Wk(c) + 1
.
Proof of Proposition 8. From Property 1 we know that there exists an improvement step r1 such that Hk(a
r1) 6= Hk(a
r1+1).
Assume w.l.o.g. thatHk(a
r1) > Hk(a
r1+1); hence
Hk(a
r1) > Hk(a
r1+1) ≥Wk(c) + 1. (21)
By the definition ofWk(c) we know that there exists an improvement step r3 such that
Hk(a
r3) = Wk(c). (22)
From Property 2 we get that for every improvement step r2, Bk(a
r2) = Sk(c), which implies that
|Hk(a
r2)−Hk(a
r2+1)| ≤ 1 (23)
Combining Equations (21),(22) and (23) with the fact that c is an improvement cycle leads to the fact that there must exist an
improvement step r such that ar ∈ {ar1 ,ar1+1, . . . ,ar3−1}, Hk(a
r) = Wk(c) + 1, and Hk(a
r+1) = Wk(c). This implies
that arpr = k and Qpr,k = Bk(a
r) = Sk(c); therefore,
uAcpr (a
r) =
D(k) ·Qpr,k
Hk(ar)
=
D(k) · Sk(c)
Wk(c) + 1
.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
To ease presentation of the proof, throughout this subsection we re-index the topics according to the following order
D(1) · S1(c) ≥ D(2) · S2(c) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m) · Sm(c).
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on several supporting lemmas, which are proven first.
Lemma 3. If c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement cycle, then for every improvement step r and every topic k it holds that
Bk(a
r) = Bk(a
r+1).
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume w.l.o.g. that c is a simple improvement cycle. First, we prove by induction on the topic index k
that Bk(a
r) ≤ Bk(a
r+1) holds for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1. Later, we leverage this result to prove the statement of the lemma.
Base: By the definition of S1(c)we know that there exists an improvement step r
′, 1 ≤ r′ ≤ l−1 such thatB1(a
r′) = S1(c).
NowAssume that the assertion does not hold for k = 1; hence, there exists r′′, 1 ≤ r′′ ≤ l−1, such thatB1(a
r′′) > B1(a
r′′+1).
Therefore, combining the above with the fact that c is an improvement cycle implies that there exists an improvement step r
such that ar ∈ {ar
′
, ar
′+1, . . . , ar
′′
} and S1(c) = B1(a
r) > B1(a
r+1). As a result, it holds for the improving author pr in
step r that Qpr,1 = S1(c) > B1(a
r
−pr
) and H1(a
r) = 1. In words, the quality of pr’s document exceeds all other qualities
under ar on topic 1; thus,
D(1) · S1(c) = u
Ac
pr
(ar). (24)
In addition, ar+1 is an improvement step for author pr, and so u
Ac
pr
(ar) < uAcpr (a
r+1). Combined with Equation (24),
D(1) · S1(c) < u
Ac
pr
(ar+1). (25)
On the other hand, uAcpr (a
r+1) ≤ D(ar+1pr )·Sar+1pr
(c) holds; thus, Equation (25) implies thatD(1)·S1(c) < D(a
r+1
pr
)·Sar+1pr
(c),
which is clearly a contradiction sinceD(1) · S1(c) ≥ D(2) · S2(c) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m) · Sm(c).
Step: Suppose the assertion holds for every k where k < K ≤ m, but does not hold forK . Similarly to the base case, by the
definition of SK(c), there exists r
′, 1 ≤ r′ ≤ l − 1 such that BK(a
r′) = SK(c). Now since the assertion does not hold forK ,
there exists r′′, 1 ≤ r′′ ≤ l − 1, such that BK(a
r′′) > BK(a
r′′+1). Therefore, combining the above with the fact that c is an
improvement cycle implies that there exists r1 such that a
r1 ∈ {ar
′
, ar
′+1, . . . , ar
′′
} and SK(c) = BK(a
r1) > BK(a
r1+1).
As a result, it holds for the improving author pr1 in step r1 that Qpr1 ,K = SK(c) > BK(a
r1
−pr1
) and HK(a
r1) = 1. In
words, the quality of pr1’s document exceeds all other qualities under a
r1 on topic K; thus,
D(K) · SK(c) = u
Ac
pr1
(ar1). (26)
In addition, uAcpr1
(ar1) < uAcpr1 (a
r1+1) holds since pr1 is the improving author; hence, with Equation (26) we get
D(K) · SK(c) < u
Ac
pr1
(ar1+1). (27)
Let k1 denote the topic that author pr1 is writing on under a
r1+1, i.e k1 = a
r1+1
pr1
. By definition of uAc we obtain
uAcpr1
(ar1+1) ≤ D(k1) ·Qpr1 ,k1 ≤ D(k1) · Sk1(c). (28)
Recall thatD(1) · S1(c) ≥ D(2) · S2(c) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m) · Sm(c); hence, Equations (27) and (28) suggest thatD(K) · SK(c) <
D(k1) · Sk1(c) holds, and therefore we are guaranteed that k1 < K .
Since k1 < K , the induction hypothesis hints that Bk1(a
r1) = Bk1(a
r1+1); therefore, Qpr1 ,k1 ≤ Bk1(a
r1) holds and by
Proposition 7 we get that Qpr1 ,k1 = Bk1(a
r1).Notice that c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition
4 holds; thus, by invoking it for r1, k1, we get
uAcpr1
(ar1+1) ≤
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1 (c) + 1
.
Together with Equation (27), we conclude that
D(K) · SK(c) <
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
. (29)
Next, we wish to find an improvement step such that the improving author’s utility strictly bounds the right-hand-side of
Equation (29). Since ar1+1pr1
= k1 andQpr1 ,k1 = Bk1(a
r1) we get thatHk1(a
r1) 6= Hk1(a
r1+1). In addition from the induction
hypothesis, we get that for every improvement step r′,Bk1(a
r′) = Sk1(c); hence, we can invoke Proposition 8 which guarantees
the existence of an index r2 such that a
r2
pr2
= k1 and
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
= uAcpr2 (a
r2). (30)
Since pr2 is the improving author u
Ac
pr2
(ar2) < uAcpr2 (a
r2+1) holds, which together with Equation (30) implies
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
< uAcpr2
(ar2+1). (31)
Let ar2+1pr2
= k2. By definition of u
Ac, we know that
uAcpr2
(ar2+1) ≤ D(k2) · Sk2(c). (32)
Observe that k2 < K must hold. To see this, assume otherwise that k2 ≥ K , andD(k2) · Sk2(c) ≤ D(K) · SK(c) follows.
Incorporating this assumption with Equations (29),(31) and (32) we obtain
D(K) · SK(c) <
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
< uAcpr2
(ar2+1) ≤ D(k2) · Sk2(c) ≤ D(K) · SK(c),
which is a contradiction; hence, k2 < K . The induction hypothesis hints that Bk2(a
r2) = Bk2(a
r2+1), implying Qpr2 ,k2 ≤
Bk2(a
r2).
Here again, the condition of Proposition 4 holds; thus, by invoking it for r2, k2 we conclude that
uAcpr2
(ar2+1) ≤
D(k2) · Sk2(c)
Wk2 (c) + 1
.
Together with Equation (31), we conclude that
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
<
D(k2) · Sk2(c)
Wk2(c) + 1
.
We have therefore bound the right-hand-side of Equation (29) as desired.
This process can be extended to obtain additional k3, k4, . . . , kK , such that for all i ∈ [K], ki < K and
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
<
D(k2) · Sk2(c)
Wk2(c) + 1
<
D(k3) · Sk3(c)
Wk3 (c) + 1
< . . . <
D(kK) · SkK (c)
WkK (c) + 1
.
While the inequality above contains K elements, there are only K − 1 topics with index lower than K; hence, at least two of
them must be identical, and we obtain a contradiction. We deduce that BK(a
r) ≤ BK(a
r+1) for every step r.
This concludes the proof of the induction. Ultimately, to end the proof of this lemma, fix a topic k. Due to the induction
above,Bk(a
r) ≤ Bk(a
r+1) holds for every 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, i.e.,
Bk(a
1) ≤ Bk(a
2) ≤ . . . ≤ Bk(a
l−1) ≤ Bk(a
l) = Bk(a
1).
The left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the inequality above are identical; thus, they must all hold in equality. This
concludes the proof of this lemma.
In addition,
Lemma 4. If c = (a1, . . . ,al = a1) is an improvement cycle, then for every improvement step r and topic k such that ar+1pr = k
there exist (r′, k′) such that ar
′+1
pr′
= k′ and
D(k) · Sk(c)
Wk(c) + 1
<
D(k′) · Sk′(c)
Wk′ (c) + 1
.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let r, k such that ar+1pr = k. From Lemma 3 we know that for every improvement step r
′′, Bk(a
r′′) =
Sk(c); thus, Qpr,k ≤ Bk(a
r) which by Proposition 7 leads to
Qpr,k = Bk(a
r) = Sk(c). (33)
By definition of improvement step arpr 6= k; hence together with Equation (33) we get that Hk(a
r) 6= Hk(a
r+1). Notice that
c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition 8 holds; hence, by invoking it for r, k we conclude the
existence of an index r′ such that ar
′
pr′
= k and
D(k) · Sk(c)
Wk(c) + 1
= uAcpr′ (a
r′).
In addition, pr′ is the improving author, and so
D(k) · Sk(c)
Wk(c) + 1
= uAcpr′ (a
r′) < uAcpr′ (a
r′+1). (34)
Clearly, ar
′+1
pr′
= k′ 6= k. Lemma 3 indicates that Bk′(a
r′) = Bk′(a
r′+1); hence, Qpr′ ,k′ ≤ Bk′(a
r′). Having showed the
condition of Proposition 4 holds, we invoke it for r′, k′ and conclude that
uAcpr′ (a
r′+1) ≤
D(k′) · Sk′(c)
Wk′ (c) + 1
.
Combining this fact with Equation (34), we get
D(k) · Sk(c)
Wk(c) + 1
<
D(k′) · Sk′(c)
Wk′ (c) + 1
.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Similarly to Theorem 1, to show that every better-response dynamics converges it suffices to show that
every improvement path is finite. Moreover, every improvement path cannot contain more than a finite number of different
strategy profiles, as m,n are finite; therefore, if γ is infinite it must contain an improvement cycle. We are left to prove that γ
cannot contain an improvement cycle.
Assume by contradiction that γ contains an improvement cycle c = (a1,a2, . . . ,al = a1). Let r1 be an arbitrary im-
provement step and denote by k1 the topic such that a
r1+1
pr1
= k1. From Lemma 4 we know that there exist (r2, k2) such that
ar2+1pr2
= k2 and
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
<
D(k2) · Sk2(c)
Wk2(c) + 1
.
Since ar2+1pr2
= k2, we can now use Lemma 4 again in order to find (r3, k3) such that a
r3+1
pr3
= k3 and
D(k2) · Sk2(c)
Wk2(c) + 1
<
D(k3) · Sk3(c)
Wk3(c) + 1
.
This process can be extended to achieve additional k4, k5, . . . , km+1 such that
D(k1) · Sk1(c)
Wk1(c) + 1
<
D(k2) · Sk2(c)
Wk2(c) + 1
< . . . <
D(km+1) · Skm+1(c)
Wkm+1(c) + 1
.
Since there are onlym topics and that the inequality above containsm+ 1 elements, there are at least two elements which are
identical; thus we obtain a contradiction. We deduce that an improvement cycle can not exist.
The above suggests that every better-response dynamics must converge.
D Omitted Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove that RRAND is uEx-learnable, one must show that every game induced by RRAND and the
utility function uEx has the FIP property.
Let G = 〈N,M,D,Q,RRAND, uEx〉 be an arbitrary game. We now reduce G to a game G′ with RPRP as the mediator,
where the utility of any author under any strategy profile in G equals to her utility under the same strategy profile in G′. If this
holds, then every improvement step in G is also an improvement step in G′; hence, if there are no improvement cycles in G′,
then there can be no improvement cycles underG either. Let G′ = 〈N,M,D,Q′, RPRP , uEx〉 forQ′ such that
∀j ∈ N, k ∈M : Q′j,k = 1.
Since both G,G′ consists of the exposure-targeted utility function, we omit the super-script Ex and use the super-script G to
specify the utility of author j under the strategy profile a in G, i.e., uGj (a), and equivalently for u
G′
j (a) forG
′.
By definition of exposure-targeted utility and RPRP , for every valid j and a it holds that
uG
′
j (a) =
m∑
k=1
1aj=k ·D(k) ·R
PRP
j (Q
′, k,a) = D(aj) · R
PRP
j (Q
′, aj ,a)
= D(aj) ·
1
Haj (a)
= D(aj) · R
RAND
j (Q, aj,a)
=
m∑
k=1
1aj=k ·D(k) ·R
RAND
j (Q, k,a)
= uGj (a).
Since G′ possesses RPRP as the mediator, Theorem 1 guarantees that G′ has the FIP property. Since we showedG and G′ are
strategically equivalent,G also has the FIP property, and in particular does not contain improvement cycles.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem’s conditions, we can find a game instance
with an improvement cycle. While all it takes to prove the theorem is to construct a single counter example (and this is what we
do), using the technique below we can actually construct an infinite number of games which do not possess FIP.
Let Rf be a scoring mediator with the corresponding function f , which we assume exhibits f(1) > 2f(0). Due to the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist x1, x2, x3 such that 0 < x3 < x2 < x1 ≤ 1 and
f(x2)
f(x3)
>
2f(x1)
f(x2)
> 2.
For brevity, denote c1 =
f(x1)
f(x2)
and c2 =
f(x2)
f(x3)
, and observe that c2 > 2c1.
Consider a game with |N | = 4 authors, |M | = 3 topics and a quality matrixQ such that

x1 0 0
x1 x2 0
x2 0 x3
0 x3 x2

 .
The only missing ingredient is the distributionD over the topics. The selection of suchD is crucial: we shall select D to allow
improvement cycles. In service of that, we prove the following claim.
Claim 1. There exists ǫ such that 0 < ǫ ≤ 14 and the following properties hold
1.
c1(1+c2)
c2(1+2c1)
< 1−2ǫ2 ,
2. 11+c1 <
1−4ǫ
2 , and
3. 1 < c2(1 − 4ǫ).
The proof of Claim 1 appears after this proof. Now, let ǫ be an arbitrary constant satisfying the properties of Claim 1, and
defineD such that
D(1) =
1
2− 3ǫ
, D(2) =
1− 2ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
, D(3) =
1− 4ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
.
It can be verified thatD is a valid distribution over the set of topics.
We claim that the game we constructed above possesses an improvement cycle. Consider the strategy profiles
a
1 = (1, 1, 1, 2), a2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a3 = (1, 2, 3, 2),
a
4 = (1, 2, 3, 3), a5 = (1, 1, 3, 3), a6 = (1, 1, 1, 3).
In the rest of this proof we show that the cycle c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) is an improvement cycle. More precisely,
we prove that for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 6, uExpr (a
r) < uExpr (a
r+1).
• uExp1 (a
1) < uExp1 (a
2): the deviating author is p1 = 2. Observe that R
f
2 (Q, 1,a
1) = c1f(x2)(1+2c1)f(x2) =
c1
1+2c1
and
R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
2) = c2f(x3)(1+c2)f(x3) =
c2
1+c2
. It holds that
uEx2 (a
1) = Rf2 (Q, 1,a
1) ·D(1) =
c1
1 + 2 c1
·
1
2− 3ǫ
=
c2
(1 + c2)(2− 3ǫ)
·
c1(1 + c2)
c2(1 + 2c1)
Property 1
<
c2
(1 + c2)(2− 3ǫ)
·
1− 2ǫ
2
= Rf2 (Q, 2,a
2) ·D(2) = uEx2 (a
2);
thus, a2 is an improvement step.
• uExp2 (a
2) < uExp2 (a
3): the deviating author is p2 = 3. Observe that R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
2) = 11+c1 and R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
3) = 1. It holds
that
uEx3 (a
2) = Rf3 (Q, 1,a
2) ·D(1) =
1
1 + c1
·
1
2− 3ǫ
Property 2
<
1− 4ǫ
2
·
1
2− 3ǫ
= 1 ·D(3) = Rf3 (Q, 3,a
3) ·D(3) = uEx3 (a
3);
thus, a3 is an improvement step.
• uExp3 (a
3) < uExp3 (a
4): the deviating author is p3 = 4. Observe that R
f
4 (Q, 2,a
3) = 11+c2 and R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
4) = c21+c2 . It
holds that
uEx4 (a
3) = Rf4 (Q, 2,a
3) ·D(2) =
1
1 + c2
·
1− 2ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
Property 3
<
c2
1 + c2
·
1− 4ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
= Rf4 (Q, 3,a
4) ·D(3) = uEx4 (a
4);
thus, a4 is an improvement step.
• uExp4 (a
4) < uExp4 (a
5): the deviating author is p4 = 2. Observe that R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
4) = 1 and Rf2 (Q, 1,a
5) = 12 . It holds that
uEx2 (a
4) = Rf2 (Q, 2,a
4) ·D(2) = 1 ·D(2) =
1− 2ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
<
1
2
·
1
2− 3ǫ
=
1
2
D(1) = Rf2 (Q, 1,a
5) ·D(1) = uEx2 (a
5);
thus, a5 is an improvement step.
• uExp5 (a
5) < uExp5 (a
6): the deviating author is p5 = 3. Observe that R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
5) = 11+c2 and R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
6) = 11+2c1 . It
holds that
uEx3 (a
5) = Rf3 (Q, 3,a
5) ·D(3) =
1
1 + c2
·
1− 4ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
<
1
1 + c2
·
1
2− 3ǫ
2c1<c2
<
1
1 + 2c1
·
1
2− 3ǫ
= Rf3 (Q, 1,a
6) ·D(1) = uEx3 (a
6);
thus, a6 is an improvement step.
• uExp6 (a
6) < uExp6 (a
1): the deviating author is p6 = 4. Observe that R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
6) = 1 and Rf4 (Q, 2,a
1) = 1. It holds that
uEx4 (a
6) = Rf4 (Q, 3,a
6) ·D(3) = 1 ·D(3) =
1− 4ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
<
1− 2ǫ
2(2− 3ǫ)
= 1 ·D(2) = Rf4 (Q, 2,a
1) ·D(2) = uEx4 (a
1);
thus, a1 is an improvement step.
The above analysis implies that c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) in an improvement cycle. As a result, Rf is not
uEx-learnable.
Proof of Claim 1. Since c2 > 2c1, it follows that
c1(1 + c2)
c2(1 + 2c1)
=
c1 + c1c2
c2 + 2c1c2
<
c2
2 + c1c2
c2 + 2c1c2
=
1
2
·
c2 + 2c1c2
c2 + 2c1c2
=
1
2
.
Since the left-hand-side is strictly less than 12 , we denote by ǫ1 a positive real number such that
c1(1 + c2)
c2(1 + 2c1)
<
1− 2ǫ1
2
.
In addition, notice that c1 > 1; thus,
1
1+c1
< 12 . We denote by ǫ2 a positive real number such that
1
1 + c1
<
1− 4 · ǫ2
2
.
Similarly, since c2 is constant and c2 > 2, there exists ǫ3 > 0 such that c2 · ǫ3 <
1
5 , which implies that
c2 · (1− 4ǫ3) > c2 − 1 > 1.
The proof is completed by setting ǫ = min{ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3}.
Proof of Theorem 4. It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem’s conditions, we can find a game instance
with an improvement cycle. While all it takes to prove the theorem is to construct a single counter example (and this is what we
do), using the technique below we can actually construct an infinite number of games which do not possess FIP.
Let Rf be a scoring mediator with the corresponding function f , which we assume exhibits f(1) > 2(2α− 1)f
(
1
α
)
for
some α > 1. Due to the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist x1, x2, x3 such that
1
α
< x3 < x2 < x1 ≤ 1 and
2(2α− 1) <
2f(x1)
f(x2)
<
f(x1)
f(x3)
< 2(2α−
1
2
)
For brevity, denote c1 =
f(x1)
f(x2)
and c2 =
f(x1)
f(x3)
, and observe that c2 > 2c1.
Consider a game with |N | = 4 authors, |M | = 3 topics and a quality matrixQ such that

x1 0 0
x1 x1 0
x2 0 x2
0 x3 x2

 .
The only missing ingredient is the distributionD over the topics. The selection of suchD is crucial: we shall select D to allow
improvement cycles. In service of that, we prove the following claim.
Claim 2. There exists ǫ such that 0 < ǫ ≤ 16 and the following properties hold
1.
c1(1+c2)
c2(1+2c1)
< 1−ǫ2 ,
2. 11+c1 <
1−2ǫ
2α , and
3.
α(1−ǫ)
1+c2
< 1−2ǫ2 .
The proof of Claim 2 appears after this proof. Now, let ǫ be an arbitrary constant satisfying the properties of Claim 2, and
defineD such that
D(1) =
2α
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
, D(2) =
α(1 − ǫ)
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
, D(3) =
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
.
It can be verified thatD is a valid distribution over the set of topics.
We claim that the game we constructed above possesses an improvement cycle. Consider the strategy profiles
a
1 = (1, 1, 1, 2), a2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a3 = (1, 2, 3, 2),
a
4 = (1, 2, 3, 3), a5 = (1, 1, 3, 3), a6 = (1, 1, 1, 3).
In the rest of this proof we show that the cycle c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) is an improvement cycle. More precisely,
we prove that for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 6, uAcpr (a
r) < uAcpr (a
r+1).
• uAcp1 (a
1) < uAcp1 (a
2): the deviating author is p1 = 2. Observe that R
f
2 (Q, 1,a
1) = c1f(x2)(1+2c1)f(x2) =
c1
1+2c1
and
R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
2) = c2f(x3)(1+c2)f(x3) =
c2
1+c2
. It holds that
uAc2 (a
1) = Rf2 (Q, 1,a
1) ·D(1) ·Q2,1 =
c1
1 + 2c1
·
2α
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x1
=
2αc2
(1 + c2) (3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2))
·
c1(1 + c2)
c2(1 + 2 c1)
· x1
Property 1
<
2αc2
(1 + c2) (3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2))
·
1− ǫ
2
· x1 =
c2
1 + c2
·
α(1− ǫ)
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x1
= Rf2 (Q, 2,a
2) ·D(2) ·Q2,2 = u
Ac
2 (a
2);
thus, a2 is an improvement step.
• uAcp2 (a
2) < uAcp2 (a
3): the deviating author is p2 = 3. Observe that R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
2) = 11+c1 and R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
3) = 1. It holds
that
uAc3 (a
2) = Rf3 (Q, 1,a
2) ·D(1) ·Q3,1 =
1
1 + c1
·
2α
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2
Property 2
<
1− 2ǫ
2α
·
2α
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2 =
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2
= 1 ·D(3) · x2 = R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
3) ·D(3) ·Q3,3 = u
Ac
3 (a
3);
thus, a3 is an improvement step.
• uAcp3 (a
3) < uAcp3 (a
4): the deviating author is p3 = 4. Observe that R
f
4 (Q, 2,a
3) = 11+c2 and R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
4) = 12 . It holds
that
uAc4 (a
3) = Rf4 (Q, 2,a
3) ·D(2) ·Q4,2 =
1
1 + c2
·
α(1 − ǫ)
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x3
Property 3
<
1− 2ǫ
2
·
1
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x3
x3<x2
<
1
2
·
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2
= Rf4 (Q, 3,a
4) ·D(3) ·Q4,3 = u
Ac
4 (a
4);
thus, a4 is an improvement step.
• uAcp4 (a
4) < uExp4 (a
5): the deviating author is p4 = 2. Observe that R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
4) = 1 and Rf2 (Q, 1,a
5) = 12 . It holds that
uAc2 (a
4) = Rf2 (Q, 2,a
4) ·D(2) ·Q2,2 = 1 ·D(2) · x2 =
α(1− ǫ)
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2
<
1
2
·
2α
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2 =
1
2
D(1) · x2 = R
f
2 (Q, 1,a
5) ·D(1) ·Q2,1 = u
Ac
2 (a
5);
thus, a5 is an improvement step.
• uAcp5 (a
5) < uAcp5 (a
6): the deviating author is p5 = 3. Observe that R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
5) = 12 and R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
6) = 11+2c1 . It holds
that
uAc3 (a
5) = Rf3 (Q, 3,a
5) ·D(3) ·Q3,3 =
1
2
·
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2
=
1
2
·
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
·
4α
4α
· x2
2c1<4α−1
<
1
2
·
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
·
4α
1 + 2c1
· x2
<
1
1 + 2c1
·
2α
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2 = R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
6) ·D(1) ·Q3,1 = u
Ac
3 (a
6);
thus, a6 is an improvement step.
• uAcp6 (a
6) < uAcp6 (a
1): the deviating author is p6 = 4. Observe that R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
6) = 1 and Rf4 (Q, 2,a
1) = 1.Since
1
α
< x3 < x2 < 1 we get that
x2
x3
< α,
implying that x2 < αx3; thus, it holds that
uAc4 (a
6) = Rf4 (Q, 3,a
6) ·D(3) ·Q4,3 =
1− 2ǫ
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x2
<
α(1 − 2ǫ)
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x3 <
α(1 − ǫ)
3α+ 1− ǫ(α+ 2)
· x3
= Rf4 (Q, 2,a
1) ·D(2) ·Q4,2 = u
Ac
4 (a
1);
thus, a1 is an improvement step.
The above analysis implies that c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) in an improvement cycle. As a result, Rf is not
uAc-learnable.
Proof of Claim 2. Since c2 > 2c1, it follows that
c1(1 + c2)
c2(1 + 2c1)
=
c1 + c1c2
c2 + 2c1c2
<
c2
2 + c1c2
c2 + 2c1c2
=
1
2
·
c2 + 2c1c2
c2 + 2c1c2
=
1
2
.
Since the left-hand-side is strictly less than 12 , we denote by ǫ1 a positive real number such that
c1(1 + c2)
c2(1 + 2c1)
<
1− ǫ1
2
.
In addition, notice that c1 > 2α− 1; thus,
1
1+c1
< 12α . We denote by ǫ2 a positive real number such that
1
1 + c1
<
1− 2ǫ2
2α
.
Since α > 1 and c2 > 4α− 2, for every 0 < ǫ3 <
1
6 it holds that
α(1 − ǫ3)
1 + c2
<
α(1 − ǫ3)
1 + 4α− 2
=
α(1 − ǫ3)
4α− 1
<
α
3α
=
1
3
=
1
2
−
1
6
<
1− 2ǫ3
2
.
The proof is completed by setting ǫ = min{ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3}.
E Non-Learnability under Action-Targeted Utility
In this section we prove non-learnability of another family of scoring mediators under uAc. We consider scoring mediators
where the corresponding function f is bounded by (non-affine) linear functions. Examples for such functions are f(x) = x and
f(x) = ex − 1.
Theorem 7. Let Rf be a scoring mediator. If f is continuous function and there exist α, β > 0 such that αx ≤ f(x) ≤
βx, ∀x ∈ [0, 1], then Rf is not uAc-learnable.
Proof of Theorem 7. It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem’s conditions, we can find a game instance
with an improvement cycle. While all it takes to prove the theorem is to construct a single counter example (and this is what we
do), using the technique below we can actually construct an infinite number of games which do not possess FIP.
Let Rf be a scoring mediator with the corresponding continuous function f , and let α and β such that α, β > 0 and
∀x ∈ [0, 1] αx ≤ f(x) ≤ βx.
For brevity, denote z = β
α
. Since α · 0 ≤ f(0) ≤ β · 0 we know that f(0) = 0. Notice that for every, x ∈ (0, 1], it must hold
that f(x) > 0 as αx ≤ f(x) where α > 0. Let x1 be an arbitrary quality such that x1 ∈ (0, 1]. Due to the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exist x2, x3 such that 0 < x3 < x2 < x1 ≤ 1 and
5zf(x2) = f(x1), 11zf(x3) = f(x1).
Consider a game with |N | = 4 authors, |M | = 3 topics and a quality matrixQ such that

x1 0 0
x1 x1 0
x2 0 x2
0 x3 x2

 .
The only missing ingredient is the distributionD over the topics. The selection of suchD is crucial: we shall select D to allow
improvement cycles. In service of that, we prove the following claim.
Claim 3. There exists ǫ such that ǫ > 0 and the following properties hold
1. 10z10z+1 ·
(
5z+0.6
15z+3.8 +
ǫ
2
)
< 11z11z+1 ·
(
5z+0.6
15z+3.8 − ǫ
)
2.
10z+1.2+ǫ(15z+3.8)
5z+1 < 2, and
3. 4.4·z15z+3.8 <
5z+0.6
15z+3.8 − ǫ.
The proof of Claim 3 appears after this proof. Now, let ǫ be an arbitrary constant satisfying the properties of Claim 3, and
defineD such that
D(1) =
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
+ ǫ, D(2) =
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ, D(3) =
2
15z + 3.8
It can be verified thatD is a valid distribution over the set of topics.
We claim that the game we constructed above possesses an improvement cycle. Consider the strategy profiles
a
1 = (1, 1, 1, 2), a2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a3 = (1, 2, 3, 2),
a
4 = (1, 2, 3, 3), a5 = (1, 1, 3, 3), a6 = (1, 1, 1, 3).
In the rest of this proof we show that the cycle c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) is an improvement cycle. More precisely,
we prove that for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 6, uAcpr (a
r) < uAcpr (a
r+1).
• uAcp1 (a
1) < uAcp1 (a
2): the deviating author is p1 = 2. Observe that R
f
2 (Q, 1,a
1) = 5zf(x2)(10z+1)f(x2) =
5z
10z+1 and
R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
2) = 11zf(x3)(11z+1)f(x3) =
11z
11z+1 . It holds that
uAc2 (a
1) = Rf2 (Q, 1,a
1) ·D(1) ·Q2,1 =
5z
10z + 1
·
(
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
+ ǫ
)
· x1
=
1
2
·
10z
10z + 1
·
(
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
+ ǫ
)
· x1 =
10z
10z + 1
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
+
ǫ
2
)
· x1
Property 1
<
11z
11z + 1
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ
)
· x1 = R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
2) ·D(2) ·Q2,2 = u
Ac
2 (a
2);
thus, a2 is an improvement step.
• uAcp2 (a
2) < uAcp2 (a
3): the deviating author is p2 = 3. Observe that R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
2) = 15z+1 and R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
3) = 1. It holds
that
uAc3 (a
2) = Rf3 (Q, 1,a
2) ·D(1) ·Q3,1 =
1
5z + 1
·
(
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
+ ǫ
)
· x2
=
1
15z + 3.8
·
(
10z + 1.2 + ǫ(15z + 3.8)
5z + 1
)
· x2
Property 2
<
2
15z + 3.8
· x2
= 1 ·D(3) · x2 = R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
2) ·D(2) ·Q3,3 = u
Ac
3 (a
3);
thus, a3 is an improvement step.
• uAcp3 (a
3) < uAcp3 (a
4): the deviating author is p3 = 4. Observe that R
f
4 (Q, 2,a
3) = 111z+1 and R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
4) = 12 . It holds
that
uAc4 (a
3) = Rf4 (Q, 2,a
3) ·D(2) ·Q4,2 =
1
11z + 1
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ
)
· x3
x3<x2
<
1
11z + 1
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ
)
· x2 <
1
11z + 1
·
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
· x2
<
1
15z + 3.8
· x2 =
1
2
·
2
15z + 3.8
· x2 = R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
4) ·D(3) ·Q4,3 = u
Ac
4 (a
3);
thus, a4 is an improvement step.
• uAcp4 (a
4) < uExp4 (a
5): the deviating author is p4 = 2. Observe that R
f
2 (Q, 2,a
4) = 1 and Rf2 (Q, 1,a
5) = 12 . It holds that
uAc2 (a
4) = Rf2 (Q, 2,a
4) ·D(2) ·Q2,2 = 1 ·D(2) · x1 =
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ
)
· x1
=
1
2
·
(
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
− 2 · ǫ
)
· x1 <
1
2
·
(
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
+ ǫ
)
· x1 =
1
2
·D(1) · x1
= Rf2 (Q, 1,a
5) ·D(1) ·Q1,2 = u
Ac
2 (a
5);
thus, a5 is an improvement step.
• uAcp5 (a
5) < uAcp5 (a
6): the deviating author is p5 = 3. Observe that R
f
3 (Q, 3,a
5) = 12 and R
f
3 (Q, 1,a
6) = 110z+1 . It holds
that
uAc3 (a
5) = Rf3 (Q, 3,a
5) ·D(3) ·Q3,3 =
1
2
·
2
15z + 3.8
· x2
=
1
15z + 3.8
· x2 <
10z + 1.2
10z + 1
·
1
15z + 3.8
· x2 =
1
10z + 1
·
10z + 1.2
15z + 3.8
· x2
= Rf3 (Q, 1,a
6) ·D(1) ·Q3,1 = u
Ac
3 (a
6);
thus, a6 is an improvement step.
• uAcp6 (a
6) < uAcp6 (a
1): the deviating author is p6 = 4. Observe that R
f
4 (Q, 3,a
6) = 1 andRf4 (Q, 2,a
1) = 1.Since for every
x, αx ≤ f(x) ≤ βx we get that
x2
x3
≤
f(x2)
αx2
f(x3)
βx3
=
β
α
·
f(x2)
f(x3)
=
11z
5
,
implying that f(x2) <
11z
5 · x3; thus, it holds that
uAc4 (a
6) = Rf4 (Q, 3,a
6) ·D(3) ·Q4,3 = 1 ·
2
15z + 3.8
· x2 ≤
2
15z + 3.8
·
11z
5
· x3
=
2
15z + 3.8
· 2.2z · x3 =
4.4z
15z + 3.8
· x3
Property 3
<
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ
)
· x3 =
= Rf4 (Q, 2,a
1) ·D(2) ·Q4,2 = u
Ac
4 (a
1);
thus, a1 is an improvement step.
The above analysis implies that c = (a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7 = a1) in an improvement cycle. As a result, Rf is not
uAc-learnable.
Proof of Claim 3. As 10z10z+1 <
11z
11z+1 , we can find ǫ1 > 0 such that,(
11z
11z + 1
+
10z
2(10z + 1)
)
· ǫ1. <
(
11z
11z + 1
−
10z
10z + 1
)
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
)
;
hence, we get that
10z
10z + 1
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
+
ǫ1
2
)
<
11z
11z + 1
·
(
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ1
)
.
Since 10z + 1.2 < 2(5z + 1) we can find ǫ2 > 0 such that
10z + 1.2
5z + 1
+ 4ǫ2 < 2.
Therefore,
10z + 1.2 + ǫ2(15z + 3.8)
5z + 1
=
10z + 1.2
5z + 1
+ ǫ2 ·
15z + 3.8
5z + 1
<
10z + 1.2
5z + 1
+ 4ǫ2 < 2
In addition, we can find ǫ3 > 0 such that
ǫ3 <
0.6z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
,
which implies that
4.4z
15z + 3.8
<
5z + 0.6
15z + 3.8
− ǫ3.
The proof is completed by setting ǫ = min{ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3}.
